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Interregional differentials in nominal wages in the Russian Federation are huge 
compared to other countries. Using the NOBUS micro-data and a methodology based on the 
estimation of the wage equation augmented by aggregate regional characteristics, we show 
that these differentials have a compensative nature. Russian workers receive wage 
compensations for living in regions with a higher price level and worse non-pecuniary 
characteristics, such as a relatively low life expectancy, a high level of air pollution, poor 
medical services and a colder climate. After adjusting for these regional characteristics, the 
relative ranking of regions in terms of average wages changes considerably. Moreover, 
regional nominal wages become positively correlated with interregional migration flows. 
According to our estimates, half of the interregional wage variation between workers 
with similar productive characteristics should be considered to be compensative. These results 
support the view that the best policy reaction to the current high interregional wage 
differentials should be the removal of migration barriers and a reduction in migration costs. In 
general, our results show that wage compensations for regional disamenities along with 
differences in employment composition are able to account for about three fourths of the 
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Interregional wage differentials exist in large and small countries. The price of labor 
cannot be the same throughout a country because the national labor market and the territory of 
the country are not homogenous. Regional labor markets demand workers with certain skills 
and evaluate similar workers differently. Moreover, market economies tend to generate 
compensating wage differentials in the labor market, and there is compensation in terms of 
wages for higher living costs and worse living conditions. The theory of compensating 
differences is able to explain most of territory wage differentials in the USA
4. Empirical 
evidence suggests that compensating interregional wage differentials also exist in the EU
5. 
However, there have been almost no studies into whether or not regional wage differences are 
compensative in transition economies.  
Russia presents an excellent case for conducting an analysis of interregional wage 
differentials. Firstly, Russia is a very large country, where environmental conditions and 
living costs vary significantly across regions. A system of wage supplements targeted to 
attract people to regions with worse living conditions existed even under a planned economy, 
and thus the compensating principle is not entirely new for Russia. Secondly, two explicit 
trends in internal migration have been observed during transition: migration from the eastern 
to the western part of the country, the so called “western drift”, and migration out of the 
Russian North. The main reasons for these migration flows were price liberalization and the 
drastic weakening of regional employment and equalizing policies. As a result, the population 
faced rising real living costs that were not compensated by income growth, in addition to a 
worsening of living conditions.
6 At the same time, the internal migration in Russia, in spite of 
being low by international standards, can be explained by “classical” factors (e.g., differences 
in opportunities on regional labor markets, living costs, regional amenities and disamenities).
7 
Finally, unconditional interregional wage differentials are huge and persistent in the country. 
They contribute significantly to the total wage inequality and generate interregional income 
variation, but an explanation for this phenomenon is still lacking.  
The goal of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of interregional wage 
differentiation. We apply the theory of compensating differences to wage differentials across 
Russian regions. Using a methodology based on the econometric estimation of a Mincer-type 
wage equation augmented with regional characteristics, we control for differences in worker 
                                                 
4 Roback (1982), Robak (1988), Beeson (199), Dumond et al., (1999) 
5 Furdato (1996)  
6 Heleniak (1999), Mkrtchian (2003, 2005), Ryasancev (2005), Karachurina (2007) 
7 Andrienko and Guriev (2004), Gerber (2006) and job characteristics and analyze the wage differentials between similar workers. The first 
step is to examine the influence of regional characteristics on individual wages. The second 
step is to estimate the extent to which the observed wage differentiation across regions 
compensates for various regional factors. 
The literature concerning interregional wage differentials in Russia is rather limited; we 
found only two papers that considered compensative interregional wage differentials in the 
country (Вerger et al.(2003), Bignebat (2005)). Our work has several important advantages. 
Firstly, we used the NOBUS database instead of the RLMS database (see the Data section); 
this allowed us to control for differences in regional employment composition much better (to 
achieve true “similarity” of workers). Moreover, our research does not suffer from the 
sample-size problem, when samples for local labor markets are comprised of only a few 
dozen observations. Secondly, most international studies, not only studies on Russia that aim 
to explain territorial wage differentials, do not go beyond establishing the statistically 
significant influence of regional amenities on individual wages. This is a fundamental step 
towards the explanation of interregional wage differentials through the compensative theory, 
but it does not suffice for making the conclusion that the theory is able to explain the 
differentials. In our study, in addition to examining wage compensations for regional 
amenities and disamenities, we also analyze differentials in regional wages adjusted for 
significant regional factors and make an attempt to estimate the explanative power of the 
theory of compensative differences. Thirdly, in our theoretical and empirical analysis we 
explicitly consider migration costs. The failure to take positive migration costs into account 
leads to biased estimates for compensations and relative regional wages. Fourthly, existing 
studies on Russia and most international studies neglect the problem of endogenous regional 
characteristics. We avoid this problem using unique Russian circumstances (see the 
Methodology section), and the results indicate that ignoring this problem may lead to spurious 
findings of statistical significance of some regional characteristics. Fifthly, we take into 
account the problem of the instability of estimates of regional level variables when 
interpreting results (see the Methodology section). Finally, we apply the theory of 
compensative differences to a later period of transition, when the Russian economy and labor 
market have had more time to adjust to market forces.  
The paper is organized as follows. The second section considers the dynamics of 
interregional wage differentials in Russia and their magnitude in comparison with other 
countries. The third section is theoretical; it discusses the principal assumptions, predictions 
and problems of applying the theory of compensative differences. A brief overview of the empirical literature will be presented in the fourth section. The methodology and data used in 
our study are described in the fifth section. Empirical findings are discussed in the sixth 
section. The conclusion and directions for future research will be given in the last section.  
 
2. The magnitude of interregional wage differentials in Russia  
The dynamics of wage differentials between Russian regions is presented in Diagram 
A.1 (see the Appendix). Macroeconomic shocks during the transformation period (price and 
trade liberalization, weakening of regional employment and equalizing policies, etc.) 
influenced regions differently. As a result, regional disparities in wages sharply increased in 
the beginning of the 1990s. They peaked in 1995 and remained persistently high afterwards. 
At the same time, they visibly exceed interregional wage differentials in other countries. 
Table A.1 (see the Appendix) shows that even in such large countries as the USA and Canada, 
the magnitude of territorial wage differences is much lower than in Russia.
8
Another way to evaluate the magnitude of interregional wage differentials is to estimate 
their contribution to the total wage inequality. Following the methodology suggested by the 
OECD and using the NOBUS dataset (a description of this dataset is given in the Data 
section) we estimated and compared the contributions of four factors (gender, education, 
industry and region) to the variance of average hourly earnings. The decomposition was based 
on the econometric estimation of an equation in which the dependent variable was the hourly 
average wage in a group of employees. These groups are formed as the intersections of the 
four characteristics given above. The results of our estimations for Russia as well as the 
















                                                 
8 Certainly, the magnitude of differentiation indicators depends on the country’s particular administrative 
division. 




regions  region 
gender 





Austria 1994  3  0,03  0,2  0,36  0,11  0,91  160 
Belgium 1995  3  0,03  0,15  0,45  0,15  0,93  156 
Canada 1997-1998  10  0,05  0,27  0,12  0,28  0,93 1563 
France 1994  8  0,12  0,13  0,25  0,03  0,72  440 
Greece 1995  4  0,03  0,27 0,21 0,27  0,9 165 
Italy 1995  11  0,04  0,1  0,31  0,24  0,89  512 
Japan
(a) 1995 47  0,12  0,47  -  0,04  0,69  4245 
Netherlands 1995  4  0,06  -  0,71  0,05  0,95  71 
Portugal 1997  5  0,06  0,1  0,29  0,23  0,95  270 
Spain 1995  7  0,08  0,17  0,34  0,15  0,91  374 




1994-1998 51  0,06 0,12 0,31 0,22  0,84  4735 
Russia
 (c)   2003 7  0,32  0,15  0,25  0,20  0,80  126 
Source: Employment Outlook. Р.: OECD. 2000. 
Comments: 1) а) Age dummies were included; b) one observation corresponds to the average wage in a group of 
workers that have the same four characteristics; c) our estimations. For Russia, workers were divided into 126 
groups using 7 Federal districts, 2 gender groups, 3 educational attainment levels (primary vocational, 
uncompleted higher education and completed higher education) and 3 sectors of the economy (primary, 
secondary and tertiary); 2) The share of variance associated with each group of dummy variables corresponds to 
the reduction in the residual term of the regression due to adding the variable after all other variables have been 
taken into account. In this procedure, the results are not sensitive to the order in which the variables are added, 
but the shares of variance do not necessarily sum up to the value of R
2. 
 
The regional factor has the largest impact on the variation of hourly wages in Russia. In 
contrast to Russia, this factor is far from being the most important in OECD countries. In 
countries such as France, Japan and Great Britain, where the impact of the regional factor is 
the largest according to OECD, the impact of this factor is about 3 times lower than in 
Russia.
10 At the same time, the impacts of the other factors in Russia are comparable to that in 
other countries. 
In conclusion, we note that interregional wage differentiation in Russia stands out in 
comparison with the differentiation that exists in other countries. High interregional wage 
differentials may cause regional well-being disparities and social tensions, and may be an 
indication of the inefficient use of human capital. Moreover, these differentials may have a 
significant impact on the overall wage inequality. Some studies on the wage inequality in 
Russia show that the effect of the regional factor into the wage inequality is the largest in 
comparison with other factors such as differences across workers in human capital 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that because of technical limitations, we distinguished only 7 regions (7 Federal Districts) 
for estimation. If a more detailed division (for example, into 79 regions) is used, then one would expect that the 
contribution of the regional factor would rise. characteristics (education, tenure, age) and occupations.
11 Therefore, the phenomenon of 
interregional wage differentials in Russia requires an explanation.  
 
3. Compensative wage differences between regional labor markets: theoretical 
background 
The textbook neoclassical model assumes that, under conditions of absolute 
interregional mobility of goods, some interregional equilibrium can be achieved, in which 
prices for the same goods are equal across a country.
12 Producers tend to sell their goods at 
the regional markets where the prices are higher. This decreases the prices at those markets 
and leads to the equalization of prices across regional markets in the long run. If one 
considers labor as a commodity and wage as the price for this commodity, then it is expected 
that the rule ”the same wage for the same labor” will hold in equilibrium. 
While interregional wage differentials could be regarded as price differentials (see, for 
example, Jonson (1974)), it is not correct to regard labor as a commodity. Unlike goods, 
whose “migration decision” is made by sellers, workers consider other things besides relative 
regional wages when making their migration decisions. The reasonable assumption 
originating from the famous work of Harris and Todaro (1970) is that employees compare 
expected, rather than relative, wages. The regional unemployment rate presents a natural 
measure for the probability of not having a job in a region. In interregional equilibrium, when 
workers do not have any reason to migrate, expected wages should be equal across regions. 
This theory suggests a positive relation between regional wages and unemployment that was 
confirmed by empirical studies (Hall et al., (1972), Ali (1978), Topel (1986)).
13  
A further elaboration of the basic model is associated with the fact that (rational) 
workers compare not the expected (nominal) wages, but rather the amounts of goods and 
services that can be purchased for these wages. It is more correct therefore to consider not 
wage differences per se, but rather differences in the purchasing power of wages, especially 
when inflation is not uniform across regions. More recent theoretical work and empirical 
research clearly conclude that not only pecuniary regional characteristics (i.e., living costs), 
but non-pecuniary ones as well are of importance in making migration decisions (see Knapp 
and Graves (1989), Greenwood et al., (1991b)), and also Greenwood et al., (1991a)). Workers 
may prefer moving from a region with higher (expected) wages to a region with lower wages, 
                                                 
11 See Lukyanova (2007) 
12 The notion of absolute mobility includes zero transportation costs. We will return to this strong assumption 
later in the paper.  
13 The wage curve assumes the opposite relation between individual wages and unemployment, see Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1994, 2005) if they are subjected to worse living conditions in the former region, where there was, for 
example, a worse (colder) climate or a higher level of (water and/or air) pollution.  
Roback (1982) in her seminal paper formulated the general prediction of the 
neoclassical theory with respect to interregional wage differentials as follows: workers with 
similar characteristics should attain the same level of utility across regions. Utility functions 
of employees include not only wages, but also living costs and various regional amenities and 
disamenities. Workers will prefer staying in a region with worse living conditions, if the 
corresponding loss in the level of utility is compensated by higher wages. In this case the 
interregional wage differentials between similar workers are considered to be compensative, 
and this gives an example of more general compensative mechanisms taking place in the labor 
market (Rosen (1986)).  
After reviewing how the theory of compensative differences explains interregional wage 
differentials, three important accompanying questions should be mentioned. 
Firstly, compensation for worse living conditions may take place not only in terms of 
wages, but also in terms of land (housing) prices. It should be expected, ceteris paribus, that 
housing prices will be higher in regions with a more attractive environment and lower in 
regions with a less attractive environment. This implies that lower housing prices compensate 
for poorer living conditions. According to Graves (1983), housing (land) price is the best 
candidate to reflect the attractiveness of a region for living, because it already captures the 
effects of various regional characteristics.  
Secondly, considering wage differentials to be compensative makes it possible to 
evaluate different non-pecuniary regional characteristics in monetary terms and construct the 
so-called quality of life indexes (QLI). The principle of constructing “prices” for different 
regional characteristics is the same as the principle of constructing prices not for goods 
themselves, but for their different characteristics (Rosen (1974)). These “prices” are not 
observed, but can be evaluated indirectly. After moving from one region to another, a worker 
begins consuming some new regional amenity or the volume of consumption of an old 
amenity (which already existed in the original region) changes. At the same time his or her 
wage also changes and this change constitutes the worker’s evaluation of the regional 
amenity. In practice, monetary estimates of non-pecuniary regional characteristics may be 
obtained from the estimation of the wage equation augmented with variables representing 
these amenities under the assumption of interregional migration equilibrium (Roback (1982), 
Blomquist et al., (1988)).      Thirdly, the compensative nature of interregional wage differentials should be viewed 
not only from the labor supply perspective, but also from that of labor demand. Firms should 
be able to pay compensations for worse living conditions. While in the public sector the 
remuneration of workers may automatically include regional supplements, in the private 
sector higher wages mean higher costs and under the conditions of perfect competition 
directly lead to exclusion from the market. This implies that either the assumption of perfect 
competition does not hold, or certain regions have characteristics that allow firms to lower 
production costs. The effects of these so-called productive amenities were modeled by 
Roback (1982) and more explicitly presented in the paper by Beeson and Eberts (1989).
14    
Summarizing the discussion presented above, we may conclude that interregional wage 
differentials between similar workers are compensative under the assumptions of perfect 
competition and absolute labor mobility. However, the theory of compensative differences 
may face a number of difficulties in its empirical implementation. 
Lack of micro data and failure to take into account significant characteristics of 
workers. Aggregate regional data cannot be used to verify the predictions of the neoclassical 
theory of compensating differences. An aggregate regional wage is an average across various 
types of labor (with different levels of accumulated human capital, various occupations and 
industries). A wage gap between two regions may be caused by differences in the regional 
composition of employment. At the same time, differences in wages of workers with the same 
characteristics may be hidden behind the equality of average regional wage levels (Duranton 
and Monastiriotis (2002)). Therefore, in order to be able to compare wages of “similar” 
workers, one needs micro-data that would be representative at the regional level to control for 
the different composition of employment across regions. 
It should be mentioned that micro-data as such is not a panacea for the problem of 
comparing “non-similar” workers. By definition, there is no survey that would identify all the 
worker and job characteristics that are important for determining wages. Consequently, the 
difficulty of considering “really equal” labor is a difficulty in the empirical implementation of 
the theory of compensating differences. This problem lead to wrong conclusions in a number 
of papers,  for example, Gallaway (1963), Sahling и Smith (1983) and Krumm (1984). 
Regional characteristics. The necessity of accounting for regional living costs and 
amenities raises several questions in testing the predictions of the neoclassical theory: 
                                                 
14 The concentration of highly productive employees may also explain why firms operate in regions with a 
relatively high wage level. In this paper, we control for the regional employment composition, and therefore this 
possibility is accounted for. 1) Some workers may have stronger preferences than others for certain regional 
characteristics. Let us assume, for example, that the number of sunny days per year is an 
important regional amenity for one group of workers, but not so important for another group. 
Then the first group of workers, ceteris paribus, will accept lower wages for living in a sunny 
area than the second group. However, we are able to observe and estimate only the average 
level of compensation for both groups, hence interregional wage differentials for the workers 
from the first group will be underestimated, and for the workers from the second group these 
differentials will be overestimated (Roback (1982, 1988)). 
2) There is no theory that would predict which regional characteristics are included in 
the utility functions of workers, i.e., which regional amenities and disamenities must be 
compensated (Roback (1982)). Moreover, even if it is known that certain regional 
characteristics are important for workers, it may be difficult to specify them. Failure to 
account for such regional characteristics leads to the overstatement of interregional wage 
differentials.  
3) Most regional characteristics, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, may be correlated 
with each other, creating econometric problems in regression analysis (Roback (1982, 1989), 
Dumond et al., (1999)). 
4) Laysperes price indexes for a common set of goods and services are usually used in 
order to control for interregional differences in living costs. However, the optimal 
consumption structure may differ across regions, and so differences in regional price levels 
may either overestimate or underestimate the differences in the levels of utility that were 
brought about by these price differentials. 
The influence of shocks and positive migration costs. At any given moment, the 
interregional wage structure may reflect not only regional endowments in amenities and 
disamenities, but also the influence of regional shocks. Shocks may arise on the side of labor 
demand, e.g., by a rise in the price for goods of regional specialization. Such a positive shock 
would lead to a growth in labor demand and push up the regional equilibrium wage. Shocks 
may arise on the side of labor supply, such as the demographic shock that arises when a 
relatively large demographic cohort enters the regional labor market. Such negative shocks 
lead to a growth in the regional labor supply and a reduction in wages. 
The effects of shocks complicate the testing of the theory of compensating differences. 
If the adjustment to shocks is prolonged and regional wages are subjected to shocks, then 
monetary evaluations of regional disamenities (compensations in terms of wages) are biased. 
For example, if an observed wage level in regions with more favorable living conditions is lower (higher) than the equilibrium wage level, then the monetary prices for non-pecuniary 
amenities will be overestimated (underestimated) in those regions (Greenwood et al., 
(1991a)). It is noteworthy that a negative correlation between the level of regional 
attractiveness for residency and the regional wage level may not even exist, if the “splashes” 
of regional wages are not controlled for. This may be the case when, for instance, a positive 
shock occurs in a region with relatively favorable living conditions.     
The analysis becomes more complicated because of the fact that different shocks exert a 
prolonged influence on the size and structure of interregional disparities. According to the 
estimations by Blanchard and Katz (1992), the effect of a shock on wage structure across 
American states disappears only in 7-10 years. Such a speed of adjustment is high compared 
to regions in the EU (Bentivogli и Pagano (1999)). Therefore, regional wages may be under 
the influence of long-standing shocks, and controlling for shocks only at the moment of 
analysis may not be sufficient. The important question arises: how should one account for 
biases in the estimates for compensations in the presence of regional shocks?   
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to understand the reason why various 
shocks exert a prolonged influence on regional labor markets. This reason lies in the failure of 
the assumption of absolute labor mobility. Indeed, if there is absolute labor mobility, then an 
immediate inflow or outflow of workers results after a negative (positive) regional shock and 
the interregional wage structure is restored. However, an immediate movement between 
regions is not possible. One can list a variety of factors that hamper migration. First of all, 
there is incomplete information. Movement to a new place of residence requires information 
about the employment opportunities and the possibilities of renting or buying a home. 
Secondly, there is underdevelopment of the housing market. This includes a lack of 
acceptable options for accommodation, an underdeveloped mortgage system and the 
relatively high transaction costs of the real estate market. Thirdly, there are liquidity 
constraints: in addition to housing costs, migration implies the costs of moving and a need to 
have funds to live before settling in. Fourthly, there are family, social and cultural ties (see 
Mincer (1978)). Fifthly, labor migration to other regions often leads to the depreciation of 
human and social capital, reducing the potential benefits from migration. Sixthly, there may 
be administrative barriers to migration. 
All these factors generate positive migration costs. And it is the magnitude of these costs 
that determines how the interregional wage structure adjusts to regional shocks. If the 
movement costs are low, then workers are more mobile and the adjustment to shocks is faster 
and more complete. If the movement costs are high, workers are less mobile and the influence of a shock is more persistent. In the extreme case, when the costs are prohibitive and 
migration does not take place, the effects of regional shocks on regional wages are not 
mitigated at all.   
These arguments bring us to the following: because of the effects of various shocks and 
given positive migration costs, interregional wage differentials reflect not only regional 
endowments in amenities and disamenities, but also the magnitude of migration costs. This 
has several implications, which are very important for empirical analysis.   
Firstly, if positive migration costs are not taken into account, as in the case when shocks 
are not included in an econometric model, the estimates for compensations in terms of wages 
for regional amenities and disamenities may be biased. The estimates may be under- or 
overestimated depending on in what region (with more favorable or less favorable conditions, 
respectively) a “splash” in wages has occurred. Moving towards absolute labor mobility 
through the removal of barriers to migration and the reduction of migration costs may lead 
either to a rise or fall in interregional differentials in (nominal) wages. It should also be noted 
that a negative correlation between regional “favorableness” and regional wages might not be 
observed at all without controlling for migration costs.  
Secondly, the factors hampering migration affect different groups of employees in 
different ways. Consequently, migration costs vary with certain worker characteristics. For 
instance, many theoretical and empirical studies indicate that employees with a higher level of 
human capital and younger employees have a higher propensity to migrate (see, for example 
Goldfarb и Yezer (1976), Topel (1986), Dickie M. и Gerking S. (1998)).
15 If so, then more 
mobile workers, ceteris paribus, will receive larger wage compensations because they can 
choose a better combination of pecuniary and non-pecuniary regional characteristics (a bundle 
of goods comprising wages and amenities) than workers, who are less mobile. In addition, the 
wages of those workers who face higher migration costs are more affected by regional shocks 
(Topel (1986)). 
Thirdly, the level of migration costs differs across regions. The costs of both migration 
in a region and migration out of a region increase because of the underdevelopment of the 
regional housing market, the remoteness of the region or the presence of administrative 
barriers. A high level of migration costs in a region implies a weak adjustment of wages in 
this region to shocks originating both from this region and from other regions. Therefore, a 
wage level in regions with high migration costs will not be similar to the wage levels in 
regions with similar living conditions but low migration costs. 
                                                 
15 A possible explanation for this fact is that such employees face a smaller depreciation of accumulated human 
capital. At the same time younger employees are on average less constrained by family and social ties. Summary. The theoretical discussion presented above suggests some recommendations 
for testing the ability of the theory of compensative differences to explain interregional wage 
differentials. Firstly, it is necessary to control for differences in employment composition 
across regional labor markets. Secondly, one should consider as large a set of regional 
characteristics as possible. Thirdly, one should control for the impacts of shocks on the 
interregional wage structure. Fourthly, one should take into account positive migration costs, 
which differ across regions. Failure to take significant regional amenities, the effects of 
shocks and the presence of migration costs into account may lead to biases in the estimates for 
wage compensations, and may even be the cause for detecting a positive relationship between 
regional “favorableness” for residency and regional wages (which would contradict the 
theory). Fifthly, as a consequence of the heterogeneity of workers, both in migration costs and 
preferences, one should examine regional wage differentials among groups of workers that are 
as homogeneous as possible.  
Overview of the empirical literature. Roback (1982, 1988) shows that in the USA the 
non-pecuniary characteristics of cities have a significant influence on the wages of workers. 
Workers receive compensation in terms of wage for such disamenites as a high crime rate, a 
high level of dustiness, a large number of cloudy days per year and a high precipitation rate. 
Including city characteristics in the wage equation substantially decreases the significance of 
the coefficients of dummies for North-American macro-regions, and most of these 
coefficients become insignificant. It suggests that a relatively high average wage in the 
northern part of the USA contains a substantial compensative component. Moreover, the 
explanatory power of the theory of compensating differences rises if interstate wage 
differentials within more homogenous groups of workers are considered. Using a similar 
methodology, but a different dataset Dumond et al. (1999) show that wage differentials across 
American macro-regions fall significantly after controlling for differences in living costs and 
some non-pecuniary factors (crime rate, air humidity, precipitation rate, and quality indices 
for health and education systems). Beeson and Eberts (1989) argue that it is important to 
consider not only consumption amenities, but also productive regional and city amenities. 
According to their estimations, productive amenities are able to explain even a higher share of 
the variation in regional wage premiums than consumption amenities. Beeson (1991) shows 
that even territory differentials in returns to education can be explained through the 
compensating approach (but not through the differences in the structure of regional labor 
demand), if the intensity of worker preferences with respect to regional characteristics is 
associated with their education level. Furdato (1996) verifies the predictions of the theory of compensating differences for 
four European countries, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain. In spite of the fact that 
interregional differentials in real wages in all four countries are higher than in nominal 
wages
16, the author finds that regional characteristics have a statistically significant impact on 
individual wages, though the signs of the coefficients for some climate characteristics may 
differ across countries.
  , 17 18
For Russia, by using the RLMS data and estimating the augmented wage equation, 
Вerger et al., (2003) show that regional
19 and city
20 characteristics have a significant impact 
on individual wages as predicted by the compensating theory. Bignebat (2005) also used the 
RLMS data and arrived at similar results.
21 Both studies conclude that interregional wage 
differentials in Russia have a substantial compensative component. 
In conclusion, we note that the theory of compensative differences is generally 
confirmed in practice. From the methodological point of view, all studies tested a wide set of 
regional characteristics and used micro-data to control for interregional differences in 
employment composition. At the same time, these studies contain several methodological 
drawbacks. Usually, they ignore the “welfare effect” (the endogeneity of some of the regional 
characteristics used) and the existence of positive migration costs. Another shortcoming is in 
neglecting the problem of instability of the coefficients for regional characteristics. The 
authors usually stop searching for an appropriate specification and start to interpret their 
findings when a joint significance of the regional coefficients is found. However, exclusion of 
a single regional variable from the specification may considerably alter the estimates and thus 
change the interpretation of the results. In addition, the heterogeneity of workers was taken 
into account only in two studies and only one study included variables to control for region-
specific shocks. In our study, we attempt to overcome all these methodological difficulties. 
  
4. Methodology and data 
                                                 
16 Housing prices were used here as a proxy for living costs, and in order to account for differences in living 
costs a method of full correction was used (see the “Regional living costs” section). 
17 The author suggests the following explanation: The type of climate in Italy and Spain differs from the type of 
climate in Great Britain, and therefore the temperature and the number of sunny hours per day in the former 
countries are more likely disamenities, while they are amenities in Great Britain  
18 The results received for Germany suggest that there is compensation for such regional characteristics as the 
proximity to natural parks, the number of sunny hours per day and the level of pollution. 
19 The number of days when the air temperature is below zero, the precipitation rate, the sickness rate, the 
conflict index. 
20 The air and water pollution level, the number of telephones per person, the number of doctors per person, 
commitment time, the crime rate, a dummy for regional capital. 
21 In this study, panel data were used that allowed to control for non-observable individual characteristics. The methodology is based on the estimation of the wage equation augmented with 
regional characteristics: 
Ln(Wi,j) = A + B*Xi,j + C*RCj+ D*Sj + E*MCj + ei,j (1) 
where Wi,j is the wage of worker i from region j; Х is the set of worker and job characteristics 
that reflect the regional employment composition; RC is the set of regional characteristics 
(amenities, disamenities and living costs), for which workers demand compensation in terms 
of wages; S is the set of variables that controls for the influence of shocks on the interregional 
wage structure; MC are the variables that control for the presence of positive migration costs; 
А is the global constant; B, C, D and E are the matrices of coefficients that are to be 
estimated; е is an error term, reflecting the influence of unobservable factors on individual 
wages.  
It is expected that the set of coefficients (C) will be significant. In other words, it is 
expected that regional characteristics (RC) will influence individual wages, if one considers 
similar workers (X), controls for the influence of regionally specific shocks (S) and accounts 
for positive migration costs (MC). The theory of compensating differences predicts that the 
coefficients for regional amenities will be negative, while the coefficients for disamenities and 
productive amenities will be positive.
22
In estimating equation (1), one should take into account regional clusterisation. The 
wages of workers from one region may be correlated, and the estimates for dispersion of 
regional coefficients may vary considerably. Moulton (1990) shows that the existing 
correlation of errors within regions leads to the underestimation of the standard errors of the 
coefficients for regional characteristics and may produce spurious findings of statistical 
significance. This implies using a robust estimation technique. However, in order to adjust 
interregional wage differentials for different factors (see below), the sample should be 
representative for regional distribution of respondents. Since this is not the case, we apply 
survey regression techniques. Estimates obtained by using this technique are analogous to 
those that can be obtained by using robust estimation, if the latter account for the regional 
clusterisation of errors and additionally use population weights.  
Adjustment of interregional wage differentials. In order to see how the adjustment for 
regional employment composition and regional characteristics influence the scale of 
interregional wage differentials we follow the methodology introduced by Dumond et al., 
                                                 
22 Productive regional amenities are amenities that allow firms to decrease costs, see Roback (1982), Beeson and 
Eberts (1989) (1994). We estimate separately three equations: the first one contains only with (X), the 
second one contains (X) and (RC), and the third one is the full specification (1), including 
controls for shocks (S) and migration costs (MC). After the estimation of each of these 
specifications we calculate two measures of interregional wage differentials: the weighted 
standard deviation (WSD) and the weighted mean standard deviation (WMAD).
23 The 
calculation of these measures is based on residuals: for every specification for each region we 
calculate the mean residual, which reflects the deviation of the mean regional wage from the 
national average. It is expected that adjusting the interregional wage differentials for different 
regional employment compositions and different endowments in amenities and disamenities 
will considerably decrease the scale of interregional wage differentials.
24
Data. A micro-database is needed for this study, one which would be representative 
both at the national and regional levels. Russian LFS does not contain information about 
wages, and the widely used Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) is not 
regionally representative. The only appropriate database is the NOBUS. This household 
survey was conducted in the spring of 2003. The advantages of this dataset are its large 
sample and its regional covering. The dataset contains information on more than 45  000 
households and is representative for the whole country and its 46 regions.
25  
The monthly average wage on a worker’s main job is used as a measure of individual 
wage. 98% of all observations were collected in May 2003; therefore we do not deflate 
wages. Observations from the lowest and highest 0.1% of the wage distribution were treated 
as outliers and excluded from the sample. Only a minority of workers had wage arrears at the 
moment of survey, and these wage arrears were not concentrated in any group of workers 
based on industry or skill. Therefore, we do not adjust wages for nonpayment as was 
commonly done in studies on Russia in the 1990s. Descriptive statistics for the NOBUS 
sample are presented in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Characteristics listed there constitute the 
set (X) of worker and job characteristics. The inclusion of this set of individual characteristics 
in the equation allows us to control for interregional differences in the employment 
composition. Regional average wages are presented in Table A.3 (in the Appendix) in 
descending order. Nominal wages are highest in the cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg 
                                                 
23 A similar methodology was used earlier by Krueger and Summers (1988) 
24 It should be noted that it is impossible to adjust interregional wage differentials for regional characteristics 
with the use of regional dummy variables because of the problem of total multicollinearity. Papers that used 
regional dummies adjusted only for the regional employment structure (see, for example, Haisken-DeNew and 
Schwarze (1997), Azzoni and Servo (2002), Garcia and Molina (2002), Viera et al., (2005)) 
25 More information about this database is available on the site of World Bank: Russian Federation/Special 
Projects and their surroundings, and in the Northern and North-Eastern regions of the country. Among 
the outsiders are the regions of the Southern and Central Federal Districts.     
In addition to micro data we use aggregated regional characteristics, which are 
published by Goskomstat (now Rosstat). We match these characteristics with the NOBUS 
database. As there is no theory that predicts which regional characteristics are compensative 
in terms of wages, the choice of regional characteristics is determined by the previous papers 
on Russia and other countries, and also, of course, by the availability of regional data. The list 
of selected characteristics contains living costs (regional price index and average prices for 1 
square meter of living space), the expected lifetime, the average temperature in January, the 
crime rate, the air pollution level, medical staff per 10 000, the number of buses, the density 
of asphalt roads, the number of telephones per person, the regional unemployment level. The 
descriptive statistics for all regional characteristics used in the study are presented in Table 
A.4 in the Appendix. 
Two variables of the set (S) were constructed using official Rosstat data on GDP and 
GRPs. The first variable is the deviation of the GRP growth rate in 2002 from the regional 
growth trend. The regional growth trend is presented as the average growth rate for the period 
2000-2005. If this variable is more (less) than one, then a positive (negative) shock in the 
region has occurred. The second variable is the average deviation of GRP growth rates from 
the GDP growth rate for the period 1999-2003. This variable reflects interregional differences 
in the speed of adjustment to the 1998 macro-shock. Additionally, we construct a variable 
reflecting the proximity of a region to the military conflict in the republic of Chechnya. This 
variable is a dummy and equals one if a region borders Chechnya.
26
In implementing our methodology, we have to take into account several difficulties.  
Instability of the estimates of the C-coefficients. The asymptotic properties of the C-
coefficients are determined not by the number of individual observations, but by the number 
of observations on the regional level, which is equal to 79 in our sample. Under such 
circumstances, the problem of the multicollinearity of regional characteristics becomes more 
acute. It implies that the significance of the C-coefficients is very sensitive to the specification 
of equation (1), and this may significantly affect the interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients. In this study we take this problem into account and interpret only those 
dependencies that are robust in all specifications. 
Endogeneity of regional characteristics. Not only Russian studies on interregional wage 
differentials, but international studies as well suffer from the problem of endogeneity. One 
                                                 
26 Only three regions, the Republics of Dagestan and Ingushetiya and the Stavropol Region, border Chechnya. can expect that in rich and developed regions the wage level is higher and the regional 
infrastructure is better than in poorer regions. This may lead to biases in estimation. It is 
difficult to avoid this problem, because, on the one hand, the characteristics of the 
infrastructure must be included in the equation, but, on the other hand, it is hard to find any 
auxiliary (instrumental) variables that reflect interregional differences in infrastructure and, at 
the same time, are not correlated with the level of regional development. However, unique 
Russian conditions allow us to solve this problem: under a planned economy the level of 
development of the regional infrastructure in Russia was determined centrally and 
exogenously with respect to regional economic development. Taking into account the high 
correlation between the indicators of regional infrastructure development in 1990 and 2003, 
one can use the indicators of 1990 as convenient instruments for the indicators of 2003.
27 In 
this study we instrument for the four regional indicators by using their 1990 values (see Data 
section and Table A.5 in the Appendix).  
Regional living costs. The theory predicts that higher regional living costs have to be 
compensated through a mechanism that is similar to that of worse living conditions. However, 
it is not clear how one should take regional living costs into account when estimating the 
wage equation.  
Firstly, regional differences in living conditions may account for a significant part of the 
interregional variation in living costs, including housing (or land) prices. Many papers show 
that including living costs into the wage equation together with non-pecuniary regional 
characteristics increases the interregional variation in wages
28. This can be viewed as an 
argument to not include living costs in the wage equation. In this paper we take into account 
this possible “cumulative” effect. We include two measures of regional living costs: the 
regional price index and the average price for 1 square meter of housing.
29  
Secondly, along with the option of including or not including measures of living costs in 
the equation, one can use a full adjustment of wages for living costs, i.e. divide individual 
wages by the corresponding regional price level before estimating the augmented wage 
equation. However, Dumond et al. (1999) show that the inclusion of the regional price levels 
                                                 
27 The same method was used in the paper by Muravyev (2006) 
28 Furdato (1996), Robak (1988), Dumond et al., (1999) 
29 In most papers, in order to account for the differences in living costs between territories, either housing prices 
were used, or they were included in the price index and determined most of its interregional variation. The price 
index in Russia does not include housing prices, and this is why we include housing prices along with the price 
index in the equation. The price index is calculated by Rosstat and recommended for interregional comparisons. 
It presents a price for a fixed set (same for all regions) of goods and services and contains such goods as 
gasoline, clothing and food.  in the left-hand side of the wage equation is a preferable way of considering regional living 
costs, and we follow their recommendations.  
Migration costs. As mentioned above, there is a long list of factors that may hamper 
interregional labor mobility. Unfortunately, many of these factors are difficult to formalize in 
order to use them in an empirical analysis. Moreover, the size of migration costs depends on 
the characteristics of both origin and destination regions, but micro-data for this does not exist 
in Russia. In addition, currently there are no studies that offer estimates for the costs of 
migration between Russian regions. 
  In this study we use the geographical distance from the capitals of the regions to 
Moscow as a proxy-variable for the level of positive migration costs. Here we implicitly 
assume that for migrants from every region, Moscow is the region of destination. Such an 
assumption is not far from reality, because Moscow (along with the Moscow region) is the 
principal region that attracts migrants in Russia.
30 It is also assumed that differences in 
geographical distance reflect differences in transportation costs, thereby accounting for 
migration costs induced by such factors as the need to pay to move. It should be clear that 
accounting for migration costs in this way fails to take into consideration the costs of 
migration induced by many other factors. Nevertheless, it allows us to obtain results, which 
conform to the theory of compensative differences (see the section Results and Discussion).      
Heterogeneity of workers. The method used in this study assumes that including the set 
of worker and job characteristics (X) in the wage equation allows us to consider interregional 
wage differentials across similar workers. However, the heterogeneity of workers can 
influence estimates not only through different worker (and job) characteristics. Firstly, 
different types of workers may have different preferences with respect to regional 
characteristics. Secondly, workers may have different propensities to migrate. In both cases 
the level of compensation for the same regional characteristics will not be equal across 
workers.  
Therefore, we estimate equation (1) both for the total sample of workers and also for 
several sub-samples. We distinguish two groups of workers by age (15-29 and 30-72), and 
two groups by whether or not there are children in a household. These groups differ 
significantly in their levels of mobility. According to Rosstat, both men and woman at the age 
of 15-29 are much more mobile than others.
31 For the purposes of our analysis it is not 
                                                 
30 According to Rosstat, during the period from 2000 to 2005 the net migration coefficient was the highest in 
Moscow and the Moscow region (if data on the Republic of Ingushetia are not considered). In 2002, Moscow 
and the Moscow region had a positive exchange of migrants with 47 regions; the Tumenskaya Region had the 
next largest positive migration balance, with 7 regions.   
31 Rosstat, “Demographic yearbook”  important what the second group of less mobile workers is, so we compare results for young 
workers with the results for all other samples without distinguishing more detailed age 
groups. The presence of children in the household, in its turn, sharply reduces mobility. We 
use also the intersections of these groups, assuming that young people with children will be 
the less mobile group, and young people without children will be the most mobile one. It 
might be expected that more mobile groups of workers will receive on average a higher level 
of wage compensation, because they are able to choose from a wider set of “wage – amenity” 
pairs. However, it should be noted that the preferences of workers might differ. 
 
5. Results and discussion 
The estimation results of the wage equation generally support the findings of other 
papers on Russia.
32 Firstly, wages grow with the level of education. Individuals with higher 
education receive about 30% more than individuals with primary education. Secondly, there is 
a positive diminishing return to age. Thirdly, there are significant wage premiums in the 
extracting industry, energy, transport and communications. Employees in the public sector 
(education and health) and agriculture receive lower wages. Fourthly, there is a clear wage 
hierarchy in occupations. Finally, the level of urbanization, ceteris paribus, positively affects 
individual wages.
33
However, the main interest of our study lies in the analysis of the influence of regional 
characteristics on individual wages. The estimation results are shown in Table A.5 in the 
Appendix. The six columns of the Table present results for six specifications of the wage 
equation. Specifications 1 and 2 are the same, including all regional characteristics and 
estimated by simple OLS (using population weights); the first one, however, was estimated 
without taking regional clusterisation into account. Controlling for regional clusterisation 
increases standard errors of the coefficients for regional characteristics, and some of them 
even become insignificant.
 This result conforms to our expectations: ignoring clusterisation 
leads to the underestimation of the standard errors of the coefficients.
34
In Specification 3, the four infrastructure variables were instrumented by their 1990 
values. The significance of all instrumented variables decreases, and two of them (medical 
staff per person and availability of buses in a region) become insignificant even at the 10% 
significance level. This finding indicates that the significance of these regional characteristics 
in Specification 2 may be explained by the “welfare effect”, i.e., by their endogeneity with 
                                                 
32 See, for example, Denisova and Karceva (2005), Oshchepkov (2006)  
33 Some explanations for this phenomenon can be found, for example, in the paper by Glaeser and Mare (2001) 
34 See Moulton (1990)    respect to the regional wage level. Specification 3 also shows that variables controlling 
regional shocks do not influence individual wages. Specification 4 confirms that excluding 
the two shock variables from the equation does not alter the estimated coefficients of the 
regional characteristics. We conclude that the estimates of coefficients of the regional 
characteristics are not biased with respect to regional shocks, and therefore the shock 
variables are excluded from further analysis. 
It is noteworthy to discuss the effects of the inclusion of distance from a region to 
Moscow (a variable reflecting migration costs) in the equation. A comparison of columns 4 
(containing the distance) and 6 (without this variable) shows that accounting for positive 
migration costs changes the estimates of the coefficients of the regional characteristics. The 
coefficient of life expectancy increases, in other words, compensation in terms of wages for 
living in a region with a low life expectancy rises. This completely satisfies the predictions of 
the theory of compensative differences. Indeed, Moscow in our case is the center of attraction 
of migrants and, at the same time, it is a region with a high level of life expectancy (in 2003, 
Moscow was third in this characteristic after the Republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan). A 
decrease in migration costs would lead to a growth of migration to Moscow, a decrease in 
wages in Moscow and an increase in wages in the regions of out-migration, where the life 
expectancy is low. Therefore, the wage compensation for living in regions with a low life 
expectancy grows. 
The decrease in the coefficient of the regional price index after including distances from 
regional capitals to Moscow in the wage equation can be explained in a similar fashion. 
Moscow in this characteristic (price level) is already a relatively “not favorable” region (in 
2003 the price levels in only two Northern regions, the Chukotka Autonomous Region and the 
Sakhalin Region, were higher than in Moscow). A reduction in migration costs would lead to 
the strengthening of the migration to Moscow, a decrease in the wages in Moscow and the 
increase of wages in the regions of out-migration. However, the price level in most of these 
regions is lower than in Moscow, and therefore the wage compensation for regional price 
levels would come down. (The reduction in the coefficient of regional housing prices after the 
inclusion of migration costs in the wage equation can be explained analogously.)  
  Specification 4 could be chosen as the basis for interpreting the coefficients. The 
regional clusterisation, “welfare effect” and positive migration costs were considered in this 
specification. Moreover, all regional characteristics are jointly significant at the 1% level of 
significance. However, the problem of the instability of the regional coefficients has still not 
been considered. This problem, as discussed above in the methodology section, is caused by both technical and theoretical reasons. On one hand, some regional characteristics are 
correlated (see Table A6 in the Appendix). On the other hand, regional characteristics 
considered by workers in their utility functions may substitute each other. For instance, a 
worker may prefer to live in a region with a higher crime level, but with a lower level of air 
pollution. These factors, given the small number of degrees of freedom (equal to the number 
of regions), result in a high sensitivity of the estimates of the regional coefficients to the 
specification form. Further analysis confirms that the exclusion of some regional variables 
alters not only the magnitude, but also the significance of the estimates for the remaining 
variables.  
The process of selecting a stable specification is presented in Table A7 (see the 
Appendix). Specification 4 was chosen as the starting point. First, we excluded the most 
insignificant regional characteristic (availability of buses) from the equation. This leads to 
changes in the size of the coefficients of some regional characteristics, a reduction in the 
significance of the number of telephones and the statistical insignificance of the regional 
unemployment level. Next, following the same principle of excluding the most insignificant 
regional variable, we successively exclude the dummy variable that reflects the proximity of a 
region to Chechnya (see Specification 7), the density of roads (see Specification 8), the 
unemployment level (see Specification 9), and the price for 1 square meter of housing (see 
Specification 10). Specification 11 contains only significant regional characteristics, and the 
further exclusion of variables does not alter the significance of the remaining variables.
35 
Specification 11 additionally includes the variable “distance to Moscow.” Comparison of the 
estimates in specifications 11 and 12 shows that inclusion of migration costs affects the 
estimates of regional characteristics (above all, life expectancy and the regional price index) 
holds valid. Thus we chose specification 11 as the final specification for interpreting the 
coefficients and the further calculation of adjusted interregional wage differentials.   
Our results show that Russian workers receive compensation in terms of wages for 
living in regions with a relatively high level of prices. The estimated coefficient of the 
regional price index does not significantly differ from one. This means that workers receive a 
10% wage compensation for living in a region where the price level is 10% higher than the 
average price level. Dumon et al. (1994) obtained an estimate for the coefficient of the 
regional price level significantly lower than one (0.457) for the USA, and Roback (1988) 
                                                 
35 It should be noted that the estimation sample increases if specification 11 is used. The reason is that 
information on housing prices was not available for 2003 for the Chukotka Autonomous Region, and therefore 
observations from this region were dropped during estimations of specifications containing this variable. received an estimate close to one (0.972).
36 Such discrepancies in the estimates may be 
explained by whether or not housing prices are included in the regional price index. In our 
study and in the study of J. Roback, unlike the study of J. Dumond et al., the price index does 
not contain housing prices. 
Russian workers also receive compensation in terms of wages for living in regions with 
a relatively low expected lifetime. They receive 2,75% wage compensation for living in a 
region where the expected lifetime is 1% lower than on average in the country (1% of the 
average expected lifetime of 64 years amounts to about 7.5 months).
37 Such regional 
characteristics as the average temperature in January, the level of air pollution, the number of 
medical stuff per person, and the number of telephones per person also have an influence on 
individual wages that is predicted by the theory of compensative differences. The last 
characteristic may be viewed as a productive regional amenity. Its positive influence may be 
explained by noting that the number of telephones decreases the costs of regional enterprises. 
The only variable with a sign that is counter to theoretical expectations, is the crime 
level. The coefficient of this variable remains negative and statistically significant in all 
specifications. The negative relation holds even if we replace this variable by one that reflects 
a similar regional characteristic, e.g. the share of crimes in a region that was committed by 
juveniles. Perhaps the crime level should also be placed among productive regional amenities.   
The results of our estimations generally agree with the results of previous studies on 
Russia.  Вerger et al. (2003) found that characteristics of cities such as the number of 
telephones per person, medical staff per person, the crime level, and the number of days per 
year when the temperature is below zero have a significant influence on individual wages. At 
the same time, the effect of air pollution was insignificant and the influence of the crime level 
was negative in this study. Bignebat (2005) found that the regional price level, the air 
pollution level and regional number of hospital beds (as an analog of our variable, medical 
staff per person) have the influence on individual wages that is predicted by the theory of 
compensative differences. However, the average temperature in January was insignificant. It 
should be emphasized that it is hard to draw any robust conclusions from the comparisons of 
results of our study and previous studies. Unlike our study, they used RLMS micro-data and 
their methodology was quite different from ours. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that 
                                                 
36 Dumond et al. Op. cit. 1999; Roback Op. cit. 1988 
37 We note that high life expectancy in Russia’s southern regions might be a consequence of a high proportion of 
people with specific religious, cultural and ethnic traditions. Therefore, it could be difficult to receive this 
amenity by moving to these regions. However, firstly, living in a neighborhood where people live longer might 
be a self-dependent amenity for migrants (for instance, from the point of view of gaining experience). Secondly, 
a high life expectancy is not possible without favorable natural and environmental conditions. our analysis has a number of advantages, because it is based on NOBUS micro-data that is 
more suitable for considering regional labor markets, and also uses a more correct 
methodology.  
What regional characteristic has a stronger influence on individual wages? In other 
words, for what regional characteristic do workers receive a higher compensation in terms of 
wages? In order to answer this question it is necessary to take into account not only the 
magnitude of the obtained coefficients, but also the variations of the corresponding regional 
characteristics. Thus, according to our calculations, the regional price index has the largest 
effect on individual wages: workers receive about 25% wage compensation for one standard 
deviation in this characteristic. The next characteristics are medical staff (per 10 000 citizens) 
and life expectancy: both about 14% of wage, followed by the number of telephones (per 
1000 citizens) (about 12% wage compensation), the average temperature in January and the 
crime level (about 8% wage compensation), and the level of air pollution (about 1% wage 
compensation for one standard deviation). 
One more interesting empirical result should be noted. Accounting for positive 
migration costs increases the constant term of the equation in all estimated specification; in 
other words, the average wage level of the reference group of workers increases. This 
suggests that the reduction of migration costs may lead to a more effective distribution of 
labor force across the regions, and therefore increase the wage level in the country as a whole. 
 
Compensations and different types of workers 
The estimation results for our final specification (Specification 11) for different groups 
of workers are presented in Table A8 (see the Appendix). The magnitude of wage 
compensation for the regional price level is a little lower for younger workers than for older 
ones. A similar result was presented in the studies of Dumond et al. (1999) for the USA and 
Lukyanova (2007) for Russia, but it was not discussed in those papers. In our work we 
suggest the following interpretation. If the level of worker mobility grows, then workers 
would migrate to Moscow (or the Moscow region). This would lower wages in Moscow and 
push up the wages in the regions of out-migration, and therefore lower the wage 
compensation for regional prices, because price levels in regions of out-migration are less 
than in Moscow. Such a finding is completely consistent with our previous results of 
including a proxy variable for migration costs in the regression: controlling for migration 
costs leads to a decrease in the size of the coefficient for the regional price index. At the same 
time, as Table A8 shows, compensation for living in regions with a low life expectancy is higher for younger workers than for older ones. This finding is also consistent with our 
previous results and has the same interpretation: out-migration from regions with a low life 
expectancy will raise the wage compensation for this characteristic.  
Then, we use another criteria for propensity to migrate (the dummy for the presence of 
children in the household) and this again confirms our findings. More mobile workers who do 
not have children receive a higher wage compensation for living in regions with a relatively 
low life expectancy than less mobile workers with children. The difference is much larger if 
we compare the most mobile (young workers without children) and the least mobile (young 
workers with children). Therefore, we conclude that the results we obtained for different 
groups of workers agree with the results obtained for the whole sample of workers. 
 
Adjustment of interregional wage differentials   
The results of adjusting the interregional wage differentials for differences in the 
regional employment composition and significant regional characteristics are shown in Table 
A.9 (see the Appendix). They are presented in deviations of average regional wages from the 
national average, which are evaluated in log-points. We refer to them below as to regional 
wage premiums. The adjustment was curried out on the basis of Specification 11. The regions 
where the NOBUS sample is representative are shaded gray. Two measures of regional wage 
dispersion, WASD and WMAD, for each specification are presented at the bottom of Table 
A.9. 
We emphasize three general findings. The first one is that a broadening of the set of 
factors smoothes interregional differentials, and as a result both WASD and WMAD decline 
by about 70%. Therefore, our analysis offers two explanations for the interregional variation 
in wages. The first one refers to cross-regional differences in composition of the employment. 
The second relies on the theory of compensating differences. Unfortunately, it is hard to 
compare the effects of each of these explanations into interregional wage differentiation. 
Their relative impacts depend on sequence in which the corresponding factors are introduced 
in the regression.  
The second general finding is that the geography of regional wage premiums totally 
changes after adjusting for different employment compositions and significant regional 
characteristics. Adjusting for employment structure considerably decreases the high wage 
premiums in the largest Russian cities, Moscow and Saint Petersburg, where both highly paid 
jobs and workers with a high level of human capital are concentrated. In contrast, wage 
premiums in traditionally low-paid regions of the Russian South (for example, the Republics of Dagestan and Adygeya) increase. Further adjustment for significant regional characteristics 
(from Specification 11) improves the situation in the southern regions of Russia. A relatively 
high life expectancy, low prices, and low levels of air pollution characterize these regions. 
The relative favorableness of these regions compensates for the lower (nominal) wages. Quite 
to the contrary, adjusting for regional characteristics lowers the wage premiums in the 
northern regions (for example, in the Murmansk and Sakhalin Regions, and in the Republic of 
Sakha (Yakutiya), where the price level is high and the life expectancy is low. 
Adjusting for living costs and regional disamenities leads to a negative (!) wage 
premium in Moscow. The high level of prices and air pollution contribute to this result, but it 
goes contrary to the fact that Moscow is a center of attraction for migrants. It may be the case 
that some regional characteristics were neglected in our analysis. Moscow is the capital of the 
country, where the headquarters of leading Russian enterprises, the central offices of many 
foreign companies, and the federal bodies of executive power and legislature are located. 
Another possible factor is the agglomeration effects of a large city (higher productivity, lower 
transaction costs, economy of scale, etc.), which allow firms to pay higher wages.    
The third finding is that regional wage premiums are closely associated with migration 
costs. On one hand, after taking these costs into account, regional premiums rise in most of 
the northeastern regions of the country (for example, in the Sakhalin, Kamchatka and 
Khabarovsk Regions), where migration costs are high because of their remoteness from 
Moscow. On the other hand, regional wage premiums come down in most of the regions of 
the Central Federal District (for instance, in the Bryansk, Ivanovo, and Lipetsk Regions), 
where the costs are low. This suggests that a reduction in moving costs will stimulate the 
migration flow from the northeastern regions to western regions, raising the wages in the 
regions of origin and decreasing the wages in the regions of destination. This means that 
workers living in the northern regions are under-compensated for unfavorable regional 
characteristics, and one of the ways to increase their wage compensation is by reducing 
migration costs.  
It may be expected that the adjustment presented above does not take into account many 
regional characteristics that are valuable for workers. Some limitations are also imposed by 
the fact that the NOBUS sample is not representative for about 30 Russian regions; this also 
adversely affects the calculation of adjusted wage premiums for regions where the NOBUS 
sample is representative. Therefore, it is clearly not correct to interpret the obtained estimates 
as recommendations for choosing a region, where people live relatively “well”. Nevertheless, 
we argue that it is not correct to draw conclusions on the well-being of people living in different regions by comparing nominal or even real regional wages. Many other regional 
characteristics need to be taken into account. 
 
Regional wage premiums and net migration  
It is natural to test the credibility of our results by establishing the correspondence 
between them and interregional migration flows.
38 The correlation between the coefficients of 
net in-migration and unconditional (observed) wage premiums turned out to be negative (see 
Table A.10 in the Appendix), i.e., the lower the wage premium in a region, the higher the 
migration rate to this region. The correlation remains negative, and its significance even rises, 
after adjusting for regional differences in employment composition. However, further 
adjustment of regional wage premiums for valuable regional characteristics makes the 
correlation positive. In other words, the sign of the correlation changes from the 
counterintuitive to what is theoretically predicted after adjustments. This suggests that 
migrants making decisions on where to move consider not only (nominal) regional wages, but 




Large interregional wage differentials have emerged in the Russian Federation since the 
beginning of the 1990s. However, no explanation for this phenomenon has been suggested. 
Using a methodology based on the estimation of the wage equation augmented by regional 
characteristics, we find two possible explanations. First, interregional wage differentials are 
associated with different compositions of employment in Russian regions. Second, workers 
are compensated for higher living costs and worse living conditions. Regional amenities 
influence individual wages as predicted by the theory of compensating differences. Russian 
workers receive wage compensations for living in regions with a higher price level and worse 
non-pecuniary characteristics, such as a relatively low life expectancy, a high level of 
pollution, poor medical services and a colder climate. According to our estimates, different 
employment compositions and wage compensation for regional disamenities account for 
about three fourths of the observed variation in regional wages. 
Our results argue that the concept of compensative differences is appropriate for 
explaining interregional wage differences in Russia. According to our estimates, half of the 
interregional wage variation between workers with similar productive characteristics should 
                                                 
38 Data on migration is taken from the statistical yearbooks “Regioni Rossii” published by Rosstat be considered as compensative. Such conclusions are relatively new for transition economies. 
While the theory of compensative differences works well for mature market economies, there 
is almost no such evidence for transition countries. In our view, Russian specifics are 
associated with the historical fact that the same regions are characterized by unfavorable 
living conditions and a high concentration of enterprises with a high level of profitability 
(above all, enterprises belonging to the exporting industries). Consequently, on one hand, 
there is a need for compensation, and on the other hand, there are the resources to pay it. 
Therefore, interregional wage differentials in Russia have a compensative character in spite of 
high migration costs.  
Our analysis suggests some policy implications. Firstly, we confirm a well-known view 
that the diversification of regional economies would lead to an increase in regional wages. 
Secondly, policies aimed at reducing interregional migration costs would contribute to the 
growth in the level of wage compensations for workers living in regions with relatively 
unfavorable living conditions. Welfare growth could be achieved in this case even in spite of 
a possible rise in the interregional differentials in nominal wages. Thirdly, our results argue 
that it is not correct to make conclusions about the well-being of regional populations by 
comparing regional (nominal) wages. A relatively low (high) level of wages in a region may 
be compensated by a higher (lower) price level or by better (worse) non-pecuniary living 
conditions. Generally, our results support the view that the best policy reaction to the 
observed high level of interregional wage differentials should be the removal of migration 
barriers and a reduction in migration costs.          
At the same time, our results indicate that the search for other explanations for the 
phenomenon of interregional wage differentials in Russia should be continued. In the 
framework of the theory of compensative differences, a broader set of regional characteristics, 
which are potentially important for workers and influence migration decisions, should be 
considered. One should also pay more attention to productive regional amenities that allow 
firms to pay wage compensations, i.e., pay higher wages. Furthermore, a series of studies on 
Russia indicate that theories other than the neoclassical theory of compensative differences 
may contribute to the understanding of the phenomenon of interregional wage differentiation. 
Wage formation mechanisms may substantially differ across regional markets.
39 This does 
not contradict the compensative character of regional wage differentials, but suggests 
considering other explanatory factors.   
 
                                                 
39 See Kapelushnikov (2003), Kondratieva (2003), Shahnovich (2003)   References 
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The left axis gives the ratio of maximum average wage across regions to the minimum average wage; the right axis 
gives the coefficient of variation of average regional wages. 
 
 
Table A.1. Interregional wage differences in Russia and other countries  
Country Number  of 
regions 
Period Max/Min  Coefficient  of 
variation 
Australia 8  1996-2001  1,28  0,083 
Germany 16  2003  1,56  0,147 
Canada   11  2001  2  - 
USA 53  1998-2002  2,19  - 
France 26  2002  1,57  0,087 
Belarus  7  I quarter of 2005  1,47  0,152 
Ukraine 27  2002-2004  2,71  0,255 





  30Table A.2. Description of the NOBUS sample 





No primary and primary  0,9 
Primary general  7,0 
Secondary 20,3 
Primary vocational (with complete secondary)  8,4 
Primary vocational (without complete secondary)  3,9 
Secondary vocational  34,3 
Higher (not completed)  3,6 
Higher and post-graduate education  21,7 
Occupations  
Management  2,6 
Leading specialists  14,4 
Specialists  20,0 
Clerks  5,7 
Workers in facilities  14,2 
Qualified workers in agriculture  4,1 
Qualified workers  16,3 
Operatives and other  6,7 
Non-qualified workers  14,3 
Military forces  1,8 
Settlement  
1 mln. and more  10,8 
500−999,9 thousands  9,1 
250−499,9 thousands  14,4 
100−249,9 thousands  11,1 
50−99,9 thousands  7,3 
20−49,9 thousands  9,5 
5 - 20 thousands  14,0 
village 24,0 
Industry  
Agriculture, hunting, forestry  8,6 
Fishing  0,9 
Extracting industry  2,7 
Manufacturing 14,9 
Energy, gas and water supply  3,8 
Construction  6,8 
Trade  11,6 
Hotels and restaurants  1,2 
Transport, communications and storage facilities  9,5 
Financial services  1,2 
Realtors and other commercial services  1,2 
Government + military forces  9,0 
Education  11,7 
Health and social programs  8,6 
Municipal and social services  7,7 
Others 0,8 
Tenure  
Less than 1 year  13,4 
1-3 years  19,5 
3-5 years  12,7 
5-10 years  17,0 
More than 10 years  37,5 
Age (years)  39,9 
Wage (roubles, after taxation)  3502,3 
Working hours (weekly)  41,0 
N 46680 
 
  31Table A.3. Mean regional wages (in rubles,.NOBUS, May 2003 г.) 
Region  N. of observations  Mean  Median  Standard deviation 
Chukotka Autonomous 
Region 127  8448,72  8000  5441,38 
Tumen Region  1102  7635,51  6000  8270,02 
Kamchatka Region  1037  6349,84  5000  4389,24 
Moscow   1133  6008,53  5000  3545,30 
Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia)   1072  5927,86  5000  5783,43 
Murmansk Region  1133  5586,88  4500  3942,26 
Moscow Region  448  5486,22  4700  4200,67 
Saint Petersburg  1142  5437,61  5000  2480,21 
Sakhalin Region  972  5171,91  4500  3547,45 
Republic of Karelia   106  4993,11  4600  2901,29 
Krasnoyarsk Region  982  4959,49  3500  4929,41 
Khabarov Region  968  4763,04  4000  3118,32 
Irkutsk Region  219  4740,62  3500  6556,77 
Magadan Region  104  4737,82  4400  2707,50 
Leningrad Region  181  4646,85  4000  2784,41 
Republic of Komi   988  4539,24  3500  4142,82 
Primorsk Region  893  4090,71  3500  3082,43 
Arhangelsk Region  976  3848,91  3000  2648,08 
Tomsk Region  130  3785,85  3000  3297,25 
Sverdlov Region  958  3713,86  3000  2620,28 
Amur Region  917  3705,28  3000  2837,62 
Kaliningrad Region  124  3659,82  3000  2886,67 
Samara Region  894  3578,15  3000  2552,69 
Kemerov Region  843  3523,60  3000  2446,73 
Republic of Altai   97  3510,29  3000  2014,38 
Chitinskaya Region  866  3466,63  2700  3010,37 
Bashkortostan republic  965  3383,01  2500  6840,43 
Chelyabinskaya Region  950  3381,46  3000  2521,14 
Novosibirskaya Region  935  3252,95  3000  2311,43 
Yaroslavskaya Region  1036  3224,56  3000  2214,09 
Republic of Buryatia   865  3217,75  2800  2355,64 
Vologda Region  180  3060,48  2600  2118,24 
Ryazan Region  125  3041,58 2500  1997,18 
Republic of Ingushetia   50  3022,10  2700  1715,39 
Republic of Tyva   67  3009,03  2500  2238,48 
Perm Region  251  3003,75  2800  1821,35 
Tver Region  917  2942,99  2500  2043,36 
Kaluga Region  175  2877,25  2500  1633,37 
Republic of Tatarstan   1098  2868,35  2500  2239,31 
Krasnodar Region  845  2815,54  2200  2834,38 
Novgorod Region  898  2807,93  2500  1749,44 
Republic of Khakassia   90  2803,14  2350  2148,03 
Omsk Region  786  2785,46  2000  2941,79 
Lipetsk Region  834  2700,76  2200  2014,97 
Vladimir Region  154  2690,96  2500  2006,95 
Nizhegorodskaya Region  882  2652,62  2200  2143,74 
Kostroma Region  834  2645,71  2100  2513,38 
Jewish Autonomous Region  81  2640,09  2400  1841,16 
Republic of Udmurtia   1108  2639,55  2300  1925,67 
Ulyanovsk Region  128  2620,36  2100  2018,81 
Kirov Region  935  2602,65  2000  3646,14 
Tula Region  140  2571,63  2490  1363,26 
Volgograd Region  845  2567,41  2100  1820,69 
  32Orenburg Region  158  2555,74  2000  1794,88 
Rostov Region  822  2548,08  2000  1907,81 
Voronezh Region  770  2543,70  2033,5  1968,27 
Astrahan Region  860  2529,53  2000  2038,17 
Kurgan Region  762  2498,23  2000  1953,03 
Smolensk Region  137  2470,58  2000  1463,61 
Pskov Region  746  2382,55  2000  1627,78 
Ivanovo Region  849  2374,38  2000  1566,05 
Republic of North Ossetia   104  2348,00  2150  1169,94 
Belgorod Region  134  2280,86  1925  1749,92 
Orlov Region  854  2266,71  2000  1515,80 
BryanskRegion 786  2249,68  2000  1503,52 
Republic of Karachaevo-
Cherkessia   91 2231,19  2000  1424,74 
Saratov Region  149  2218,70  1860  1778,05 
Republic of Chuvashia   170  2212,48  1800  1619,32 
Penza Region  129  2208,80  1700  1943,47 
Tambov Region  681  2200,68  2000  1485,29 
Republic of Adigeya   724  2190,62  1900  1426,97 
Altai Region  166  2166,25  2000  1307,62 
Republic of Kabardino-
Balkarskaya.  721 2121,52  1900  1245,62 
Republic of Mordovia   798  2068,04  1700  1720,24 
Stavropol Region  151  2043,01  2000  1086,69 
KurskRegion 117  2027,56  1800  1215,57 
Republic of Mari-El   115  2014,91  1600  1496,37 
Republic of Dagestan   653  1907,19  1700  1276,33 
Republic of Kalmikia   105  1785,46  1600  970,94 
Total 46338  3559,15  2800  3462,72 
Comments: 1) nominal wages after taxation (the tax rate is 13% and the same for all regions); 2)  Regions where the 
NOBUS sample is representative are shaded gray. 
 
  33 Table A.4. Regional characteristics used in analysis (2003) 
Characteristics of the set  (RC)  Mean Median Minimum  Maximum  Country  mean 
2877,7 7962,3 
Regional price index (rubles)  3570,6 3291,4  Tambov Region 
Chukotka Autonomous 
Region  3577 
54,3 75,1 
Life expectancy (years)  64,3  64,0  Republic of Tyva  Republic of Ingushetia  65,07 
3696 31804 
Price for 1 square meter of housing on the secondary market 
(rubles) 10131,8 9720,5 
Republic of Karachaevo-
Cherkessia Moscow  12785 
-34,9 2,6 
Average temperature in January (
0C)  -11,39 -10,7  Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)   Krasnodar Region  -11,39 
326 3232 
Crime rate (per 100 000 citizens)  1901,0  1897,0  Republic of Ingushetia  Jewish Autonomous Region  1907 
0,04 88,18 
Air pollution (tons per 1 sq. km)  3,63  1,1  Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)  Moscow  1,16 
64,2 316.3 
Medical staff (per 10 000 citizens)  165,6  163,6  Republic of Ingushetia 
Chukotka Autonomous 
Region  159.6 
10 119 
Buses (per 100 000 citizens)  62,6  64,0  Sakhalin Region  Magadan Region  64 
0,8 352 
Road density (km per 1000 sq. km)  116,45  119  Chukotka Autonomous Region  Moscow Region  32 
47 348.2 
Stationary telephones  (per 1000 citizens)  225,6  230,6  Republic of Ingushetia  Saint-Petersburg  240 
1,3 53,1 
Regional unemployment level (%)  10  9,1  Moscow Republic  of  Ingushetia  8,6 
Characteristics of the set (S)              
0,56 1,12  Deviation of the GRP growth rate in 2002 from the regional growth 
trend (Shock-1)  0,95 0,95  Republic of Ingushetia  Primorsk Region  0,92 
0,82 1,08  Average deviation of GRP growth rates from the GDP growth rate 
(Shock-2)  0,96 0,96  Republic of Kalmykia  Jewish Autonomous Region  1 
Characteristics of the set (МС)  0 6784,92 
Distance from the regional capital to Moscow (km)  1790,6 1087,7  Moscow Kamchatka  Region  - 
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 TableA.5. Influence of regional characteristics on individual wages 
Specifications 
   1  2  3 4 5 6 




















































Buses (per 100 000 citizens) 
а 0,002
** 0,002
** 0,001 0,001  0,002
** 0,002 
Road density (km per 1 sq. km) 
a 0,095 0,095 0,423  0,455  0,592  0,638
*







Regional unemployment level (ln)  0,161
** 0,161
** 0,101 0,091  0,140
** 0,135 
Proximity to conflicts 
b (dummy)  0,183
** 0,183  0,116 0,111 0,205 0,213
*
Distance from the regional capital to 
Moscow (km)  -0,027
** -0,027  -0,015  -0,015       
Shock-1 0,239
** 0,239  0,291  0,225    
Shock-2 0,276








R-squared  0,513  0,518  0,513 0,512 0,517 0,517 
N.  of  observations  46213  46213  46213 46213 46213 46213 
Comments: 1) 
** coefficient is significant at the 1% level; 
*coefficient is significant at the 5% level.  
2) a  - these variables were instrumented by their own values for 1990.  
3) b -  this variable equals 1 for the Republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia and for the Stavropol Region, its value for 
the other regions are 0. 
 
 
  35Table A.6. Correlations of regional characteristics 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11 12 









(2) Life expectancy (ln)   1  0.17 0.64
* -0.66
* 0.12 -0.15 0.29
* 0.49
* 0.13 0.14 -0.27
*
(3) Price for 1 square meter of 
housing (ln)    1  0.00 0.05 0.38
* 0.09 -0.11 0.12 0.09 -0.53
* -0.38
*
(4) Average temperature in 
January 
     1  -0.58
* -0.05 -0.21
* 0.16 0.69
* 0.08 0.08 -0.42
*
(5) Crime rate        1  0.15 0.19
* -0.19
* -0.55
* -0.12 -0.15 0.30
*
(6) Air pollution          1  0.00 0.30
* -0.19
* -0.12 -0.14 0.02 
(7) Medical staff          1  0.06 -0.13  0.59
* -0.35
* -0.05 
(8) Buses            1  0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 




(10) Stationary telephones             1  -0.40
* -0.33
*
(11) Regional unemployment 
level (ln) 
            1  0.55
*
(12) Distance from the regional 
capital to Moscow  
            1 
Comment: 
*coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
 
Table A.7. Excluding insignificant regional variables  
Specifications 
   4 7 8 9  10  11  12 





















** 0,086      



































Buses (per 100 000 citizens) 
а 0,001              
Road density (km per 1 sq. km) 
a 0,455  0,472  0,464          










Regional unemployment level (ln)  0,091
* 0,082 0,090
* 0,071         
Proximity to conflicts* (dummy)  0,111  0,088              
Distance from the regional capital to 









R-squared  0,512 0,512 0,512 0,512 0,511 0,511 0,510 
N.  of  observations  46213 46213 46213 46213 46213 46340 46340 
Comments: 1) 
** coefficient is significant at the 1% level; 
*coefficient is significant at the 5% level; 
2) а – these variables were instrumented by their own values for 1990; 
3) * This variable equals 1 for the Republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia and for the Stavropol Region, its value for 
the other regions are 0. 
 
.
  36Table A.8. Estimation of final specification (11) for subgroups of workers 
   Age  Children   15-29 
   15-29  30-72  yes  no  No children  children 
Control for migration costs  yes no yes no yes no  yes  no yes no yes  no 


































































Medical staff (per 10 000 citizens) 
a -0,005 -0,007  -0,006
** -0,008 -0,003 -0,004 -0,008
** -0,010
** -0,007
** -0,008 -0,001  -0,002 























R-squared  0,479 0,476 0,523 0,522 0,516 0.514  0,511  0,509 0,472 0,469 0,505  0,504 
N. of observations  11002 11002 35338 35338 21254 21254  25086  25086  5773  5773  5229  5229 
Comments: 1) 
** coefficient is significant at the 1% level; the other coefficients are insignificant at the 5% level; 
                   2) a - these variables were instrumented by their own values for 1990 
 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Belgorod Region  0,882  -0,428  -0,184  0,092  0,104 
Bryansk Region  0,853  -0,412  -0,274  -0,086  -0,094 
Vladimir Region  1,229  -0,151  -0,103  0,078  0,051 
Voronezh Region  1,455  -0,312  -0,191  -0,039  -0,036 
Ivanovo Region  0,855  -0,345  -0,209  -0,036  -0,075 
Kaluga Region  0,907  -0,129  -0,064  -0,113  -0,099 
Kostroma Region  0,522  -0,272  -0,109  0,034  -0,002 
Kursk Region  0,877  -0,488  -0,227  -0,165  -0,156 
Lipetsk Region  0,794  -0,207  -0,101  0,022  0,009 
Moscow Region  5,109  0,482  0,398  0,238  0,168 
Orlov Region  0,583  -0,385  -0,207  0,028  0,023 
Ryazan Region  0,745  -0,083 -0,020  0,049  0,026 
Smolensk Region  0,836  -0,243  -0,118  0,042  0,031 
Tambov Region  0,684  -0,404  -0,264  -0,079  -0,077 
Tver Region  1,172  -0,162  -0,026  0,025  -0,011 
Tula Region  1,212  -0,218  -0,154  -0,150  -0,163 
Yaroslavl Region  1,075  -0,041  -0,003  0,167  0,135 
Moscow  7,662  0,638  0,201  -0,065  -0,093 
Republic of Karelia  0,620  0,423  0,386  0,355  0,328 
Republic of Komi  0,800  0,271  0,310  0,089  0,075 
Arhangelsk Region  1,068  0,090  0,196  0,036  0,022 
Vologda Region  1,006  -0,092  0,131  0,128  0,109 
Kaliningrad Region  0,717  0,005  0,082  0,168  0,179 
Leningrad Region  1,356  0,329  0,383  0,211  0,234 
Murmansk Region  0,846  0,477  0,494  0,057  0,077 
Novgorod Region  0,526  -0,155  -0,040  0,012  -0,007 
Pskov Region  0,488  -0,345  -0,195  -0,108  -0,096 
Saint - Petersburg  4,308  0,564  0,146  0,122  0,182 
Republic of Adigeya   0,233  -0,382  -0,243  -0,024  0,044 
Republic of Dagestan   0,809  -0,550  -0,383  0,064  0,088 
Republic of Ingushetia   0,103  -0,008  0,065  0,342  0,413 
Republic of Kabardino-
Balkarskaya.  0,338  -0,415  -0,289  0,094  0,117 
Republic of Kalmykia   0,175  -0,677  -0,312  -0,023  0,018 
Republic of  Karachaevo-
Cherkessia   0,229  -0,389  -0,279  -0,100  -0,017 
Republic of North Ossetia   0,414  -0,299  -0,246  0,201  0,220 
Krasnodars Region  3,106  -0,254  -0,090  -0,035  -0,007 
Stavropol Region  1,517  -0,472  -0,250  -0,153  -0,097 
  38Astrahan Region  0,646  -0,325  -0,217  0,247  0,238 
VolgogradRegion  1,653  -0,299  -0,235  -0,037  -0,034 
Rostov Region  2,603  -0,315  -0,215  -0,034  -0,013 
Republic of Bashkortostan   2,647  -0,140  -0,128  0,032  0,035 
Republic of Mari-El   0,495  -0,554  -0,289  -0,080  -0,087 
Republic of Mordovia   0,554  -0,512  -0,345  -0,090  -0,103 
Republic of Tatarstan   2,730  -0,184  -0,209  0,177  0,154 
Republic of Udmurtia  1,218  -0,256  -0,143  -0,014  -0,022 
Republic of Chuvashia   1,053  -0,582  -0,433  -0,166  -0,171 
Kirov Region  1,116  -0,325  -0,141  -0,051  -0,062 
Nizhegorodskaya Region  2,558  -0,257  -0,285  -0,239  -0,239 
Orenburg Region  1,507  -0,479  -0,301  -0,189  -0,188 
Penza Region  0,784  -0,498  -0,322  -0,154  -0,159 
Perm Region  2,191  -0,078  -0,070  -0,003  -0,009 
Samara Region  2,199  0,019  -0,100  -0,020  -0,020 
Saratov Region  1,713  -0,464  -0,425  -0,271  -0,279 
Ulyanovsk Region  0,858  -0,266  -0,254  -0,112  -0,123 
Kurgan Region  0,653  -0,363  -0,170  0,040  0,043 
Sverdlov Region  3,267  0,065  0,030  0,016  0,015 
Tumena Region  2,402  0,659  0,627  0,107  0,114 
Chelyabinsk Region  2,596  -0,016  -0,099  -0,024  -0,023 
Republic of Altai  0,130  0,017  0,167  0,075  0,098 
Republic of Buryatia   0,601  -0,083  0,059  -0,025  -0,028 
Republic of Tyva   0,109  -0,317  -0,028  -0,378  -0,389 
Republic of Khakassia   0,376  -0,200  -0,063  -0,152  -0,111 
Altai Region  1,566  -0,431  -0,211  -0,016  0,005 
Krasnoyarsk Region  2,175  0,210  0,296  -0,130  -0,122 
Irkutsk Region  1,953  0,238  0,279  0,109  0,116 
Kemerov Region  1,846  0,038  -0,002  -0,149  -0,145 
Novosibirsk Region  1,845  -0,057  -0,168  -0,013  0,012 
Omsk Region  1,181  -0,305  -0,335  0,055  0,041 
Tomsk Region  0,840  -0,009  0,080  0,058  0,064 
Chitin Region  0,719  -0,045  0,115  -0,089  -0,093 
Republic of Saha (Yakutia)   0,655  0,547  0,624  -0,024  -0,010 
Primorski Region  1,499  0,164  0,206  -0,108  -0,062 
Khabarovsk Region  1,143  0,349  0,332  0,019  0,046 
Amur Region  0,679  0,020  0,146  -0,190  -0,181 
Kamchatka Region  0,298  0,629  0,631  0,293  0,359 
Magadan Region  0,182  0,355  0,430  -0,003  0,048 
Sakhalin Region  0,443  0,410  0,447  0,008  0,076 
Jewish Autonomous Region  0,142  -0,258  0,071  -0,190  -0,138 
Chukotka Autonomous Region  0,063  0,933  1,176  -0,243  -0,110 
WSD     0,371  0,258  0,126  0,123 
WMAD     0,310  0,216  0,098  0,095 
Comment: Regions where the NOBUS sample is representative are marked by gray. 
 
  39Table A.10. Correlations between wage premiums and net migration coefficients 
Wage  premiums  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Unadjusted -0,111  -0,205  -0,242
* -0,276
* -0,159 -0,070 
Adjusted for employment 






 Adjusted for employment 
composition and significant 
regional characteristics 
(Specification 11)  0,355
* 0,162 0,221
* 0,148 0,141 0,117 
Comments: 1) net migration coefficient is the difference between inflows and outflows divided by the average 
regional population. 2) 
* Coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
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